88 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
88 lines
4.3 KiB
Markdown
# Validation Report Template
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## Validator
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Name: Codex Validation Agent
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Stage Reviewed: Agent 07 - Security And Deployment Hardening
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Date: 2026-04-15
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## Reviewed Inputs
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- `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/WORKFLOW.md`
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- `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/PRODUCT_SPEC.md`
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- `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md`
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- `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/DEVELOPMENT_WORKFLOW.md`
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- `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/OPERATOR_QUICKSTART_RU.md`
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- `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/handoffs/07-security-deploy.md`
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- previous stage validation report: `/Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/validation/06-client-api-ui-validation.md`
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- implementation files under `internal/config`, `internal/app`, `internal/db`, `internal/auth`, `internal/http`, `web/templates`, `deploy`, and root deployment files
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- `GOCACHE=/tmp/go-build-agent07-validate GOMODCACHE=/tmp/go-mod-agent06-http go test ./...` -> passed
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- `GOCACHE=/tmp/go-build-agent07-build GOMODCACHE=/tmp/go-mod-agent06-http go build -o /tmp/update-server-agent07-validate ./cmd/server` -> passed
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- `GOCACHE=/tmp/go-build-agent07-migrate GOMODCACHE=/tmp/go-mod-agent06-http go build -o /tmp/update-migrate-agent07-validate ./cmd/migrate` -> passed
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- `command -v docker` -> command not available in this environment, so `docker compose config` and container runtime checks could not be executed here
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- live smoke checks against an HTTP-configured hardened server on `127.0.0.1:18088`:
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- `GET /admin/login` -> `200 OK` with:
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- `Cache-Control: no-store, private, max-age=0`
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- `Content-Security-Policy`
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- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
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- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
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- `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer`
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- `Permissions-Policy`
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- `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin`
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- `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin`
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- `Vary: Cookie`
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- CSRF cookie scoped to `/admin`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`
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- `POST /admin/login` without CSRF token -> `403 Forbidden`
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- `POST /admin/login` with valid CSRF token -> `303 See Other` with:
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- session cookie scoped to `/admin`
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- `HttpOnly`
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- `SameSite=Lax`
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- rotated CSRF cookie scoped to `/admin`
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- `GET /api/v1/projects` without bearer token -> `401 Unauthorized` with:
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- `Cache-Control: no-store, private, max-age=0`
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- `Vary: Authorization`
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- shared security headers
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- created a download-capable API key through the hardened admin flow and verified:
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- first two `GET /api/v1/projects` requests -> `200 OK`
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- third request -> `429 Too Many Requests` with `Retry-After: 1`
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- changing `X-Forwarded-For` between those requests did not bypass the rate limit while `TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS` remained false, confirming socket-address behavior in practice
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- live smoke checks against an HTTPS-configured hardened server on `127.0.0.1:18089` with `APP_BASE_URL=https://updates.example.com`:
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- `GET /admin/login` -> `200 OK` with `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000`
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- CSRF cookie carried `Secure`, `Path=/admin`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`
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- `POST /admin/login` with valid CSRF token -> `303 See Other` with session cookie carrying `Secure`, `Path=/admin`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`
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- static review of deployment artifacts:
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- `Dockerfile`
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- `docker-compose.yml`
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- `deploy/Caddyfile.example`
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- `deploy/nginx.update-server.conf.example`
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- `deploy/update-server.env.example`
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- `docs/DEPLOYMENT.md`
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## Findings
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No blocking findings.
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The stage satisfies the agreed scope:
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- admin and protected client routes emit sane security defaults;
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- CSRF protection is enforced on admin POST flows;
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- cookies are scoped to `/admin` and switch to `Secure` when the public base URL is HTTPS;
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- login and protected client API rate limits work;
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- trusted proxy handling is opt-in;
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- deployment and backup or restore documentation is present and coherent with the current architecture;
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- artifacts remain private and continue flowing through authenticated application endpoints.
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## Required Fixes
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None.
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## Optional Improvements
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- Run `docker compose up --build` and one reverse-proxy example on the real target host before first production exposure, since Docker was unavailable in this validation environment.
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- If you later run multiple app instances, replace the current in-memory rate limiter with a shared store-backed or proxy-backed limiter.
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## Status
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`APPROVED`
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