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update_server/docs/agents/validation/07-security-deploy-validation.md
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Validation Report Template

Validator

Name: Codex Validation Agent

Stage Reviewed: Agent 07 - Security And Deployment Hardening

Date: 2026-04-15

Reviewed Inputs

  • /Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/WORKFLOW.md
  • /Users/delete/projects/update_server/PRODUCT_SPEC.md
  • /Users/delete/projects/update_server/IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md
  • /Users/delete/projects/update_server/DEVELOPMENT_WORKFLOW.md
  • /Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/OPERATOR_QUICKSTART_RU.md
  • /Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/handoffs/07-security-deploy.md
  • previous stage validation report: /Users/delete/projects/update_server/docs/agents/validation/06-client-api-ui-validation.md
  • implementation files under internal/config, internal/app, internal/db, internal/auth, internal/http, web/templates, deploy, and root deployment files
  • GOCACHE=/tmp/go-build-agent07-validate GOMODCACHE=/tmp/go-mod-agent06-http go test ./... -> passed
  • GOCACHE=/tmp/go-build-agent07-build GOMODCACHE=/tmp/go-mod-agent06-http go build -o /tmp/update-server-agent07-validate ./cmd/server -> passed
  • GOCACHE=/tmp/go-build-agent07-migrate GOMODCACHE=/tmp/go-mod-agent06-http go build -o /tmp/update-migrate-agent07-validate ./cmd/migrate -> passed
  • command -v docker -> command not available in this environment, so docker compose config and container runtime checks could not be executed here
  • live smoke checks against an HTTP-configured hardened server on 127.0.0.1:18088:
    • GET /admin/login -> 200 OK with:
      • Cache-Control: no-store, private, max-age=0
      • Content-Security-Policy
      • X-Frame-Options: DENY
      • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
      • Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
      • Permissions-Policy
      • Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
      • Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
      • Vary: Cookie
      • CSRF cookie scoped to /admin, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict
    • POST /admin/login without CSRF token -> 403 Forbidden
    • POST /admin/login with valid CSRF token -> 303 See Other with:
      • session cookie scoped to /admin
      • HttpOnly
      • SameSite=Lax
      • rotated CSRF cookie scoped to /admin
    • GET /api/v1/projects without bearer token -> 401 Unauthorized with:
      • Cache-Control: no-store, private, max-age=0
      • Vary: Authorization
      • shared security headers
    • created a download-capable API key through the hardened admin flow and verified:
      • first two GET /api/v1/projects requests -> 200 OK
      • third request -> 429 Too Many Requests with Retry-After: 1
      • changing X-Forwarded-For between those requests did not bypass the rate limit while TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS remained false, confirming socket-address behavior in practice
  • live smoke checks against an HTTPS-configured hardened server on 127.0.0.1:18089 with APP_BASE_URL=https://updates.example.com:
    • GET /admin/login -> 200 OK with Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000
    • CSRF cookie carried Secure, Path=/admin, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict
    • POST /admin/login with valid CSRF token -> 303 See Other with session cookie carrying Secure, Path=/admin, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax
  • static review of deployment artifacts:
    • Dockerfile
    • docker-compose.yml
    • deploy/Caddyfile.example
    • deploy/nginx.update-server.conf.example
    • deploy/update-server.env.example
    • docs/DEPLOYMENT.md

Findings

No blocking findings.

The stage satisfies the agreed scope:

  • admin and protected client routes emit sane security defaults;
  • CSRF protection is enforced on admin POST flows;
  • cookies are scoped to /admin and switch to Secure when the public base URL is HTTPS;
  • login and protected client API rate limits work;
  • trusted proxy handling is opt-in;
  • deployment and backup or restore documentation is present and coherent with the current architecture;
  • artifacts remain private and continue flowing through authenticated application endpoints.

Required Fixes

None.

Optional Improvements

  • Run docker compose up --build and one reverse-proxy example on the real target host before first production exposure, since Docker was unavailable in this validation environment.
  • If you later run multiple app instances, replace the current in-memory rate limiter with a shared store-backed or proxy-backed limiter.

Status

APPROVED